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FOREIGN EX PARTE DIVORCES AND LOCAL
CLAIMS TO ALIMONY
GEORGE W. STUMBERG*
It will be recalled that in Williams v. North Carolina,' the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the fact of domicile as a jurisdic-.
tional factor for divorce may be questioned abroad when the matter of
full faith and credit is in issue there. On the same day that this case was
decided, a majority of the Court arrived at the same conclusion in the
case of Esenwein v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.2 Except for the
concurring opinion of Justice Douglas, the Esenwein case would have
no particular significance. The background facts were similar to' those
in the second Williams case. The husband and wife had lived in Penn-
sylvania. The husband secured a Nevada divorce without, so it was
contended, acquiring a domicile in that state. However, the question to
be decided was whether the divorce superseded a pre-existing support
order granted the wife in Pennsylvania after the separation of the
couple and some time before the husband's departure for Nevada,
rather than, as in the Wililams case, one of liability to criminal prose-
cution for bigamous cohabitation of a spouse who had secured a divorce
in a state where he had not acquired a domicile. To a majority of the
Supreme Court the rationale of the Williams case applied. The Nevada
decree was not entitled to full faith and credit. As a consequence, the
decision by the Pennsylvania courts that the support order had not
been superseded by the Nevada decree was upheld. To Justice Douglas,
who it might be noted joined in the dissent in the second Williams case,'
the matter involved was quite different. He would have required that
the Nevada decree be given full faith and credit insofar as the respective
personal marital duties of the spouses might be concerned but not
insofar as interspousal property claims (including a prior support
order) might be involved.
The matter came before the Supreme Court in a more direct form in
the case of Estin v. Estin.' In this case the wife, while the spouses were
* Professor of Law, University of Texas.
'Williams v. North Caraolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945). The Williams case and its
sequences were discussed in an earlier issue of this journal, 33 WASH. L. REv. 331
(1958).
2325 U.S. 279 (1945).
-1325 U.S. 226 (1945), Justice Douglas joined in the dissent written by Justice
Black. Justice Rutledge also dissented in a separate opinion.
'334 U.S. 541 (1948).
!W4SHINGTON LAW REVIEW
living in New York, obtained a separate maintenance order. Thereafter
the husband migrated to Nevada, where he secured a divorce decree
which was subsequently set up as a defense to a suit in New York on
the prior order for support. Unlike the situation in the Esenwein case,
it was assumed by the New York courts that the Nevada decree was
entitled to full faith and credit. Consequently, the sole issue was
whether the local decree for separate maintenance survived the foreign
divorce. The New York courts held that it did.' A majority of the
Supreme Court affirmed. Justice Douglas, who wrote the majority
opinion, took the position that the prior order was a property interest
of which the wife could not be deprived by the Nevada court without
personal jurisdiction over her.' He also emphasized the interest of New
York in preventing its citizens from becoming public charges. More
recently, in 1957, the Supreme Court upheld a New York decision to
the effect that an ex-wife may successfully sue her ex-husband for
maintenance even though the foreign ex parte divorce was granted
prior to the suit. In the case, Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt,7 the husband
and wife had lived in California before separating. The husband
secured a divorce in Nevada, the validity of which was not questioned
in the New York courts.' Pending the Nevada proceedings, the wife
moved to New York where the support suit was brought after the
Nevada decree had been entered. The justification for permitting the
suit was said to be New York's interest in Mrs. Vanderbilt's not becom-
ing a public charge.
The problem of survival of a claim to alimony after a valid divorce is
not entirely new. For example, in Toncray v. Toncray, decided in
1910, the Supreme Court of Tennessee stated that a Tennessee wife
whose husband had left the marital abode and had secured a divorce in
Virginia, where he had admittedly acquired a domicile, could success-
fully sue for alimony in Tennessee even though the validity of the
Virginia divorce might otherwise be recognized. However, a majority
5 Estin v. Estin, 296 N.Y. 308; 73 N.E.2d 113 (1947).
0334 U.S. 541 (1948) (Frankfurter and Jackson, dissenting). Justice Jackson took
the position that if under New York law a New York divorce could terminate a pre-
existing maintenance order, a foreign divorce entitled to full faith and credit would
necessarily have the same effect.
7 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
8 See Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 1 N.Y.2d 342, 135 N.E.2d 553, 153 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1956). The petitioner had reside din Nevada prior to his marriage. He returned to
Nevada from California after the spouses were separated, and still resided there at
the time of the New York suit by Mrs. Vanderbilt. Mr. Vanderbilt's prior and present
connection with Nevada was held to be sufficient to justify a holding that he w%-as
domiciled in Nevada. The first Williams case controlled. So the Nevada decree was
entitled to full faith and credit.
9 123 Tenn. 476, 131 S.W. 977 (1910).
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of the state courts have, at least prior to the first Williams case, held to
the contrary, usually, but not always, through interpretation of local
statutes in such a manner as to permit recovery of alimony only as an
incident to suit for divorce." If the foreign divorce was valid for pur-
poses of full faith and credit, local suit for support could not be brought.
Therefore there could be no claim for alimony. Even so, it should be
kept in mind that prior to the first Williams case an ex parte divorce
not granted at the matrimonial domicile did not have to be given full
faith and credit. A court could give effect to the claims of a local wife
against a migrant husband simply by refusing to recognize a divorce
secured by him abroad, even though he might have acquired a domicile
there. There was therefore relatively little occasion to consider the
matter of survival of a duty to support. The first Williams case changed
the picture. Now if the wife's claim to alimony does not survive a
divorce, a husband by migrating to another state and securing a divorce;
there can defeat any claim that the wife might otherwise have to sup-
port. With this changed picture in mind, both courts " and legislatures
have given attention anew to the general problem of survival. New
York is one of the states which provided by statute for survival of
alimony over a prior ex parte divorce. Suit by Mrs. Vanderbilt was, of
course, under the New York statute. 2
It might be urged that a wife whose husband has migrated and
brought a suit for divorce abroad could protect her claim to support by
intervening in the foreign proceedings to contest or to counterclaim for
alimony. However, if she did, she would run the risk of an adverse
decision by a court whose views with respect to alimony might not be
as receptive as would those at her domicile. The husband might even
sue for divorce in a state where under local law the courts could under
no circumstances grant alimony. For example, one can easily imagine
a situation in which a New York husband, after learning of the Texas
10 See, Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 1378 (1953) ; See also McCoy v. McCoy, 191 Iowa 973,
183 N.W. 377 (1921). Cf, Dimon v. Dimon, 40 Cal.2d 516, 254 P.2d 528 (1953) (dis-
senting opinion of Traynor, J). See also Meredith v. Meredith 204, F.2d 64 (D.C. Cir.
1953) in which it was held a trial court in the District of Columbia would not award
maintenance independently of divorce; Hobson v. Hobson, 221 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir.
1953) where the wife sued the husband for support in the District of Columbia after he
had obtained an exparte divorce in Florida. It was said, "the court has general equity
powers, which are not supplanted by the statute, and which are broad enough in appro-
priate circumstances to support a grant of maintenance after an exparte divorce." (two.judges dissented). For a relatively recent article see PAUrLSEN, Support Rights and
Out-of-State Divorce, 38 MINN. L. Rav. (1954).
1 See Annot., 28 A.LR.2d 1378 (1953).
'
2 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT. § 1170-b (as amended); 6A N.Y. CrviL PRAcTrcE § 1170-b(Gilbert-Bliss Supp. 1956). See also Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, I N.Y.2d 342, 135
N.E.2d 553, 153 N.Y.S2d 1 (1956).
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law concerning alimony, migrates to Texas, where after residence for
the locally required period, he sues for divorce. Under Texas law there
is no alimony whatever." Even though the wife appears to claim it, she
would not be successful, because, irrespective of the circumstances, a
Texas court cannot grant it. Of course, if the wife appears in the for-
eign proceedings, she would be bound everywhere by whatever decision
the foreign court might make.14 The New York legislature in enacting
the statute authorizing local suit for alimony, which was before the
New York courts and the Supreme Court in the Vanderbilt case, while
it probably did not have specifically in mind the Texas extreme, seems
to have given consideration to the inconvenience and hazards involved
if the respondent spouse were required to claim alimony abroad in order
to secure it at all. In any event, the New York legislature and the New
York courts were of the opinion that the State of New York had a
legitimate claim to assertion of protection to a New York wife without
regard to whether her interest in alimony is called property or whether
her protection is justified by vague talk in terms of New York's interest
in the wife not becoming a public charge.
. There is, however, an implication in the Vanderbilt case which if
followed through should, it is submitted, be given further consideration
if or when the matter specifically comes before the Supreme Court.
Although Mrs. Vanderbilt seemingly moved from California to New
York before the Nevada proceedings were begun, or at least before the
divorce was granted, there was in the case an implication that, under
the New York statute, even though she had become a resident of New
York at any time, whether before the foreign divorce proceedings were
begun or even after the decree was entered, the same result would have
been reached. It seems to be stretching unreasonably the thesis of a
13 In Texas there is no alimony. Though a Texas court has wide discretion in the
division of the property of the spouses, under normal circumstances the property,
whether community or separate, is not adequate to provide for support. A relatively
recent statute authorizes a Texas court to entertain a suit for divorce if the petitioner
has been stationed in Texas, as a member of the armed forces for a period of twelve
motnhs, without regard to domicile in that state. This statute has recently been upheld
by the Texas Supreme Court. Wood v. Wood, No. A7041, Jan. 28, 1959. It can be
anticipated that increasing numbers of armed forces personnel stationed in Texas will
bring suit for divorce under this statute, particularly when they learn that a Texas
court will not grant alimony even if the wife should intervene. If the Supreme Court
of the United States holds this statute to be constitutional from a full faith and credit
point of view, a grave injustice could be done to the wife, if a claim for support were
not allowed to survive in her home state.
14 See Loeb v. Loeb, 155 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1956), aff'd 4 N.Y.2d 54, 152 N.E.2d 36
(1958), in which it was said that "a wife who establishes a separate residence in this
state. . . gains nothing unless she establishes something more than convenience." The
circumstances surrounding the case, removal from Vermont to New York after a
Nevada decree, were held not to justify recovery under the New York statute.
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state's interest in its domiciliaries to include those who become residents
after the impact of the foreign divorce proceedings has taken place.
Furthermore, if this implication is sustained, it could encourage migra-
tion to New York by spouses living in other states where the courts may
not look upon alimony with the same degree of favor as does New York.
The interest in protecting the wife would, where she becomes a resident
of New York after the divorce, seem to lie preponderantly with the state
where she previously resided.
Justice Frankfurter, who dissented in the Vanderbilt case, was of the
opinion that the view of the majority conflicts with Supreme Court cases
which arose before the end of the era of Haddock." These cases include
Thompson v. Thompson,6 Atherton v. Atherton," and Haddock v.
Haddock." It is respectfully submitted that this is not necessarily the
case. While it is true that in Thompson a Virginia divorce granted at
the matrimonial domicile was held to preclude judicial separation and
alimony in the District of Columbia, the Supreme Court may have only
been expressing a District of Columbia policy, i.e., a local federal policy,
as to the effect of a valid divorce decree on a claim to alimony." Fur-
thermore, a majority of the court was not then thinking in terms of the
effect of a foreign ex parte divorce not granted at the matrimonial
domicile, simply because such a decree would not then have had to be
given full faith and credit. In Atherton the New York courts in honor-
ing Mrs. Atherton's claim to support did so because they were of the
opinion that the Kentucky divorce, even though granted at the matri-
monial domicile, was not entitled to full faith and credit. Since at the
time a claim for alimony did not in New York survive a valid divorce,
the sole question was whether the Kentucky decree-was effective as a
valid one in New York. When the Supreme Court held that the Ken-
tucky decree was entitled to full faith and credit, the New York rule
that support does not survive divorce automatically became effective.
Again in Haddock where a Connecticut divorce decree granted the hus-
band under facts similar to those in Williams was held not to be entitled
1r In the Vanderbilt case Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, conceded that
if the Nevada court had had personal jurisdiction over the defendant the situation
would have been different. Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent, contended that it had
been held in the past that a court having jurisdiction for purposes of divorce could also
litigate with respect to alimony, irrespective of jurisdiction in personam.
10226 U.S. 551 (1913).
17 181 U.S. 155 (1901).
"8201 U.S. 562 (1906).
19 See note 10 supra. Cf. Hobson v. Hobson, 221 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1953) where
the court held that the right to support survived a Florida divorce, (two judges dis-
senting), although it had previously reached a different result with respect to the effect
of a Texas decree on a similar question. Meredith v. Meredith, 204 F2d 64 (1953).
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to full faith and credit, the New York courts granted the wife's prayer
for judicial separation and maintenance because in their opinion the
husband had not secured a divorce decree which was effective in New
York. Hence the New York rule of non-survival did not apply. When
the Supreme Court affirmed, it did so solely because it concluded that
the New York courts did not have to recognize the Connecticut decree
as valid in New York. The matter in issue was not one of survival of
maintenance over a valid divorce but one of the validity of the divorce.
The first Williams case created a new problem, one of giving economic
protection to a locally domiciled spouse against the effects of a migra-
tory divorce secured by the other spouse in a state where he alone is
domiciled. What the New York legislature sought to do was to assure
such protection. This the Supreme Court held to be a constitutional
objective.
There remains the matter of full faith and credit. When Mrs. Van-
derbilt brought her suit in New York she did so by sequestering Mr.
Vanderbilt's property there. While a claimant may reach local assets
through sequestration or attachment, a judgment or decree against the
respondent to be effective at home as well as abroad must be based on
'jurisdiction in personam.2 The respondent, if a non-resident, must be
served with process in the state. It can be anticipated that in some
future case a proper decree in personam will be granted, followed by an
attempt to recover on it in another state.
As has already been pointed out, it has long since been well settled
that the ordinary alimony decree, at least as to installments past due
and not subject to revision, must be given full faith and credit, even
though as an original matter a similar decree would not be granted by
the courts of the state where enforcement is sought.21 In a recent Cali-
fornia case,22" recovery was permitted on a New Jersey support decree
which antedated a foreign divorce granted ex parte. The California
Court treated the problem of the survival of the New Jersey decree as
one to be controlled by reference to New Jersey law. It found that
under that law the decree survived. It then allowed recovery upon a
theory that since the decree continued to be effective in New Jersey, it
should be treated as effective in California.
20 See Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957). See also the separate dis-
senting opinions by Justice Harlan and by Justice Frankfurter. Justice Frankfurter
expressed the view that a court having jurisdiction to grant a divorce may also pass
on matters of alimony without regard otherwise to jurisdiction in personam.
21 See Barberv. Barber, 365 U.S. 77 (1944) ; Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910).
2 2 Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal.2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955).
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However, the Supreme Court of Washington= may entertain a differ-
ent opinion, since in a recent case it seems to have taken the position
that a Massachusetts support order which was granted the wife prior to
suit for divorce by the husband in Washington created no more than a
Massachusetts duty from the husband to the wife. This duty did not
have to be recognized in Washington, since the courts of that state,
because of Washington's interest in the obligation of the husband, a
local domiciliary, to support his wife, could determine independently
the amount of support he should be compelled to pay. The court appar-
ently treated the situation as one involving a problem of giving con-
sideration to the interests of the two states in their local domiciliaries,
with each free to emphasize its interest within its own borders. In other
words, the Massachusetts interest in the support of the wife justified a
support decree in Massachusetts, but that interest could be defeated
when it clashed with Washington's interest in what the husband should
pay. Consequently, when the claim by the Massachusetts wife was
made against a local resident in Washington, the interest of that state
in the extent of the obligation of the husband domiciled there prevailed
there, in spite of the fact that the husband's duty had already been
established by the Massachusetts court.2 A difficulty with this point of
view is that, even though it may be properly said that the Massachusetts
duty of the husband to support the wife was based on that state's
interest in her plight, that duty, once a support order or decree has been
entered, under the traditional point of view becomes merged into a
money decree, a debt. 5 The fact that a sister state may originally have
had at home its own opposing interest or that it would not have reache4
a result similar to that reached in the state where suit was originally
brought does not authorize denial of full faith and credit.
It was pointed out long ago that if the courts of the several states
could, impose their own views as to the proper law to be applied to a
case when originally tried abroad, they could, by that much, abrogate
the effect of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. In
Fauntleroy v. LuM,2 for example, the original cause of action arose in
". Perry v. Perry, 51 Wn.2d 358, 318 P.2d 968 (1958).
" Attcntion should be called to the fact that what Judge Finley, writing for the
Supreme Court of Washington, said was probably unnecessary to the decision, since
he came to the conclusion that under Massachusetts law the preexisting support decree
would not survive a valid divorce. He was also of the opinion that proper notice had
not been given the husband at the time of docketing the judgment for prior support
under the original Massachusetts decree. Recovery was allowed for installments in
arrears at the time the divorce was granted, but not for those accruing thereafter.
25 Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 771 (1944) ; Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910);
Barber v. Barber 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858).20210 U.S. 231 (1907).
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Mississippi. In that state an agreement to deal in cotton futures consti-
tuted a gambling debt unenforceable under the law there. Suit was
brought in a Missouri court for breach of such an agreement. The
Missouri court disregarded the Mississippi law and awarded judgment
to the plaintiff. Suit on the Missouri judgment was then brought in
Mississippi, where full faith and credit was denied on the ground that
the Missouri court had not given proper consideration to the Mississippi
law. On appeal the Supreme Court held that the Mississippi court was
obliged to give full faith and credit to the Missouri judgment even
though that judgment was based upon an error with respect to Missis-
sippi law and even though the Missouri court may have wrongfully
disregarded a claim for the application of the law of Mississippi. A
similar point of view prevailed without dissent in Roche v. McDonald.",
There suit was brought in Washington on an Oregon judgment. The
Washington courts refused to enforce the judgment because the Oregon
court, so it was found, misapplied Washington law. The Supreme Court
of the United States reversed.While neither of the foregoing cases involved a situation where an
attempt was made to enforce abroad a decree for maintenance which
had been held to survive divorce, or which, as in the Vanderbilt case,
was entered after the dissolution of the marriage, they do establish
these two underlying principles: First, under the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution, the original cause of action is merged into the
judgment; the judgment constitutes the debt; second, even though a
court may disapprove the reasons for entering the original judgment, it
must be given full faith and credit. Also, as has been previously stated,
decrees for alimony, at least insofar as installments past due and not
subject to revision are concerned, come within the mandate of the
Constitution."
It might be added that the grounds for permissible denial of full faith
to sister state judgments have become very narrow indeed. Under the
decided cases, such credit may be denied where the foreign court lacked
jurisdiction,29 where jurisdiction was secured through intrinsic fraud,"0
27 275 U.S. 449 (1927). See also Union National Bank of Wichita v. Lamb, 337
U.S. 38 (1949).
28 See text accompanying note 21, supra.
29 Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873). Cf. Treinies v. Sunshine
Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939) in which it was held if defendant litigates in the
original suit the matter of jurisdiction and the decision goes against him, the question
of lack of jurisdiction cannot be raised elsewhere. His only recourse is appeal to a
higher court, the Supreme Court of the United States if necessary.
20 Cf. Levin v. Gladstein, 142 N.C. 482, 55 S.E. 371 (1906).
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or where the judgment was not on the merits,31 as where the original suit
was dismissed because of the running of the statute of limitations or
dismissed because of improper venue or because of lack of jurisdiction.
The full faith and credit clause of the Constitution is an expression of
national poilcy; as such it has been consistently held to apply where a
matter has been litigated by a competent court on the merits. It is
extremely doubtful whether the Supreme Court will now permit a
departure from the established national policy because of conflicting
claims of local state policy.
See Warner v. Buffalo Drydock Co., 67 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1933).
1959]
